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Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to provide a review of Rodrigo Cordero’s Crisis and 
critique: On the fragile foundations of social life (2017).1 To this end, the analysis examines 
Cordero’s book at several levels. The first part makes some general observations on its 
principal strengths. The second part gives a brief overview of its thematic structure. The 
third part elucidates its key arguments. The fourth part sheds light on its most significant 
limitations. The paper concludes by identifying major challenges to which, in light of the 
methodical evaluation of Cordero’s study, we need to face up in order to do justice to 
the tension-laden role that the relationship between crisis and critique can, and should, 
play in contemporary social theory. 
 
 
1. Strengths 
Let me begin by drawing attention to some noteworthy strengths of Cordero’s 
excellent book. A few months before its publication, the author kindly asked me to 
provide an endorsement. Allow me to quote my endorsement here, since it sums 
up the gist of my (largely favourable) assessment of this study: 
Rodrigo Cordero has done a magnificent job in shedding light on the pivotal role that both 
crisis and critique play in the tension-laden construction of human reality. This book is a powerful 
reminder of the profound fragility that permeates the whole of social life, including its 
seemingly most solidified dimensions. I have never come across a more persuasive account  
of the multiple ways in which the dynamic relationship between the experience of crisis and the 
practice of critique defines – and, indeed, constantly redefines – the normative parameters for 
what it means to be human. (i, italics added) 
My endorsement summarizes what I regard as three essential contributions of 
Cordero’s book: 
 
 
 
(a) its ability to shed light on the pivotal role that both crisis and critique play in the 
tension-laden construction of human reality; 
(b) its ability to illustrate the extent to which the whole of social life is permeated not 
only by a profound sense of fragility, at both the subjective level and the 
intersubjective level, but also by a profound state of fragility, at the objective level; 
and 
(c) its ability to enhance our understanding of the multiple ways in which the 
dynamic relationship between the experience of crisis and the practice of critique defines – 
and, indeed, constantly redefines – the normative parameters for what it means to be 
human. 
 
Before examining the substantial intellectual contributions of Crisis and critique in 
detail, let us briefly consider some of its general strengths. At least five positive qualities 
of this study stand out. 
 
1.1. Structure 
Both in terms of its overall structure and in terms of the internal structure of each 
chapter, the book is smartly organized. To be exact, it contains the following key 
sections: 
 
(a) an Introduction (1–12); 
(b) three Parts (13–57 [Part I], 59–100 [Part II], and 101–52 [Part III]); 
(c) a Postscript (153–61); 
(d) an extensive Bibliography (162–77);  and 
(e) a valuable and user-friendly Index (178–86). (Unfortunately, the Index of Subjects 
and the Index of Names are collapsed into one another.) 
 
Furthermore, the book contains an Acknowledgments section (xi–xii), which should not 
go unnoticed, as it comprises several important personal remarks on the biographical 
factors that form the background to this study. A cursory look at the Table of Contents 
(ix–x) and at the Introduction (1–12) suffices to recognize that the manuscript is 
embedded in a sophisticated, clever, and cogent epistemic architecture. 
Most readers – especially those who are less familiar with the key thinkers and themes 
in question – will appreciate the fact that each chapter covers at least three dimensions 
that are crucial for a comprehensive understanding of the principal points made in each 
section: (a) historical context, (b) central issues and contributions, as well as (c) strengths and 
weaknesses. This tripartite mission, pursued in each chapter, permits the reader to grasp 
the following aspects in relation to the scholars and topics occupying a paradigmatic 
place in Cordero’s investigation: 
  
 
(a) the historical circumstances by which particular thinkers were influenced before and/ 
or when developing their respective theoretical frameworks; 
(b) the central issues at stake in the writings of prominent scholars – or, indeed, of 
intellectual currents – as well as their most significant contributions to modern 
social and political thought; and 
(c) the most striking strengths and weaknesses of the conceptual frameworks under 
consideration, based on insightful accounts of their respective merits and 
limitations. 
 
This tripartite analytical strategy, which is more or less consistently applied in each of 
the six key chapters, enables the reader to obtain a balanced understanding of the role of the 
relationship between crisis and critique in the works of major social and political thinkers. 
 
Cordero’s inquiry into the place of the concepts of ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’ in the history 
of modern intellectual thought has, in epistemic terms, delivered on fundamental levels 
of social-scientific knowledge production: (a) description; (b) analysis, interpretation, and 
explanation; and (c) assessment. 
 
(a) It skilfully describes the historical contexts in which particular understandings (and, 
arguably, misunderstandings) of ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’ emerged. 
(b) It competently analyses, interprets, and explains the essential conceptual 
presuppositions underlying specific accounts of ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’, elucidating the 
extent to which these two terms are (and are not) interrelated. 
(c) It carefully assesses the value of the contributions made by leading intellectual 
figures to contemporary debates on the relationship between ‘crisis’ and 
‘critique’. What is, in my view, noteworthy in this regard is the following: even 
when Cordero strongly sympathizes with a specific theoretical perspective, he 
does not shy away from the task of putting his finger on its respective 
limitations and shortcomings; analogously, even when Cordero expresses 
serious doubts about the validity of a conceptual framework in question, he 
makes every effort to draw his reader’s attention to some of its most valuable 
contributions. 
 
In brief, Cordero’s study comprises (a) accurate historical descriptions, (b) insightful 
analyses, interpretations, and explanations, as well as (c) balanced, grounded, and critical 
assessments. 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2. Scope 
In any in-depth investigation, authors have to make a decision on where their story starts 
and where it ends. In this respect, Cordero’s book is no exception. When skimming 
through the list of authors mentioned in the Table of Contents (ix–x) as well as those that 
are included in the Index (178–86), one may easily get the impression that this project is  
overly ambitious, trying to cover too much intellectual ground, comparing and 
contrasting  too many different scholars and too many different traditions of thought, 
and seeking to tell too long a story, given the limitations attached to a conventional 
monograph of medium-size length. A closer examination of the manuscript reveals,  
however, that Cordero has done an outstanding job in providing an unprecedented account of 
key modern approaches to the relationship between crisis and critique. Far from rushing through 
what is, inevitably, dense theoretical material, Cordero has succeeded in engaging with a 
number of notoriously complex thinkers at a high level of abstraction and sophistication,  
but  without  losing sight of the socio-historical situatedness of their writings, let alone of the 
tangible relevance of their intellectual contributions to real-life issues. 
It is also worth pointing out that Cordero’s erudite way of approaching the subject is 
reflected in the fact that his elucidation of the relationship between crisis and critique in 
the works of influential social and political thinkers is based on a healthy balance 
between primary and secondary sources, demonstrating that his key arguments are 
derived from a thorough  examination  of  central  original  texts,  whilst  being  informed  
and inspired by disputes and controversies between advocates and opponents of 
particular theoretical traditions. 
 
1.3. Depth 
Because of the way in which Cordero adeptly combines the descriptive, analytical, 
interpretive, explanatory, and evaluative dimensions underlying his comprehensive 
inquiry into the role that  the  relationship  between  crisis  and  critique  plays  in  modern  
social  and political thought, the depth of his study is remarkable. Indeed, he brilliantly 
cross-fertilizes author-focused and issue-focused levels of consideration. Thus, an eclectic 
list of scholars and an equally diverse list of themes are covered and scrutinized through 
the lenses of one key question: What is their respective understanding of the  
relationship between crisis and critique? Each chapter responds to  this  question  in  a  
systematic  fashion – that is, by reflecting upon (a) historical circumstances, (b) central 
issues and contributions, as well as (c) strengths and weaknesses. In light of this task, 
paradigmatic works of the following authors are examined: Karl Marx and Ulrich Beck  
(Chapter  1), Georg W. F. Hegel  and  Niklas  Luhmann  (Chapter  2),  Jürgen  Habermas  
(Chapter  3)  and Reinhart Koselleck (Chapter 4), Hannah Arendt  (Chapter  5),  Michel  
Foucault  (Chapter  6),  and  Theodor  W.  Adorno (Postscript). 
Surely, one may legitimately object that it is impossible to do justice to the complexity 
of their writings in a medium-size monograph. Yet, since Cordero, throughout the book, 
is guided by a sharp analytical motivation, which is expressed in his sociological concern 
with the relationship between crisis and critique, the depth of his investigation is not 
compromised by its scope. In other words, the crisis/critique problematic serves as a 
Leitmotif catching the readers’ attention and monitoring them through what is a 
  
 
conceptually differentiated – and, in some ways, amorphous – landscape of ideas, 
presuppositions, and propositions. One of Cordero’s greatest achievements, in this 
respect, is that he succeeds in separating essential from non-essential arguments. Hence, 
rather than offering superficial, shorthand, or misleading snapshots of complex conceptual 
frameworks, Cordero penetrates deep into  the  rough  sea  of  modern  intellectual  
thought  by  demonstrating  that – although, admittedly, to different degrees – the 
relationship between crisis and critique plays a pivotal role in the works of prominent 
social and political theorists. By virtue of his aforementioned tripartite analytical 
approach, Cordero has managed to provide his reader with a painstakingly detailed 
account of the multiple ways in which the relationship between crisis and critique has 
been both represented and misrepresented, conceptualized and misconceptualized, as 
well as understood and misunderstood in modern social and political thought. 
 
 
1.4. Language 
For the right or the wrong reasons, ‘social theory is often perceived as hopelessly 
abstract  and unnecessarily complex – that is, as a conceptually sophisticated way of 
making relatively simple points in a remarkably difficult language’ (Susen 2013a, 83). 
Cordero is to be congratulated for having produced a superb piece of work that, although 
large parts of it are written at a high level of abstraction and sophistication, is linguistically 
accessible to non-specialists and non-experts. One of the reasons for this is the book’s 
conceptual clarity. Another reason for this is that, particularly when dealing with 
complex theoretical issues, Cordero rightly insists on both their spatiotemporal embeddedness 
in socio-historically contingent contexts and their tangible relevance to real-life issues. Throughout 
the inquiry, Cordero provides numerous concrete examples to illustrate the 
sociological significance of important theoretical points that may otherwise come 
across as removed from the empirical realm of social practices. Put differently, the 
linguistic style in which the book is written is symptomatic of the epistemic convictions 
upon which it is based: instead of falling into the theoreticist trap of hiding a potential 
lack of content-related substance behind a veil of an impenetrable terminology of 
pompous expressions, Cordero has put together an argument that is presented not 
only with considerable eloquence and elegance, but also with conceptual precision 
and clarity. 
 
1.5. Contemporary relevance 
One of the greatest achievements of Cordero’s treatise is that it succeeds in offering a 
comprehensive, systematic, and fine-grained account of the role that the relationship 
between crisis and critique plays in the writings of major modern social and  political  
thinkers without getting caught up in the pointless exercise of intellectualist exegesis. 
Cordero’s study is not simply another book in the history of modern social and political 
thought with a short shelf life. Its purpose, instead of being merely exegetical or 
decorative, is ambitious: rather than constructing a narrative about the genealogy of the 
relationship between crisis and critique, the point of Cordero’s inquiry is to identify 
valuable lessons that can be learned from exploring how these concepts have been used 
 
 
(and misused) by influential thinkers and how they  should  (and  should  not)  be  used  
in  contemporary  forms  of  social and political analysis. The result is a fascinating 
theoretical exposition, which transcends rigid epistemic boundaries – such as those set 
up between ‘the classical’ and ‘the contemporary’, ‘the philosophical’ and ‘the 
sociological’, ‘the conceptual’ and ‘the empirical’, ‘the concrete’ and ‘the abstract’, ‘the 
continental’ and ‘the analytical’, ‘the macro’ and ‘the micro’. Moreover, it convincingly 
demonstrates that, far from being reducible to two sub-categories of marginal 
importance, crisis and critique constitute two foundational moments of social life in 
general and two foundational categories of social investigation in particular. It is no 
accident, then, that these two concepts lie at the core of the key works that have shaped 
modern social and political thought all the way from the early Enlightenment to the  
contemporary era. 
 
 
2. Thematic structure 
As mentioned above, the book is divided into (a) an Introduction (1–12), (b) three Parts 
(13–57 [Part I], 59–100 [Part II], and 101–52 [Part III]), and (c) a Postscript (153–61), in 
addition to containing (d) an extensive Bibliography (162–77) as well as (e) a valuable and 
user-friendly Index (178–86). 
 
2.1. Part I 
Part I is entitled ‘Sociologies of crisis/critiques of sociology’ (13–57). This part examines  
the numerous ways in which the idea of crisis has been scrutinized, problematized, and 
criticized within sociological theory, whilst elucidating the principal objections raised by 
social theorists when calling the ‘promises’ of social critique (articulated by intellectuals) 
and social criticism (formulated by ordinary actors) into  question. 
Chapter 1 – entitled ‘The critique of crisis: From Marx to Beck’ (15–37) – provides a 
comprehensive, and highly sophisticated, overview  of  the  explanatory  role  assigned  
to the concept of crisis ‘at the core of the sociological tradition’ (9). A key aspect, in this  
regard, is Cordero’s critical analysis of – in his words – ‘the normalization and dissolution of 
crisis in sociological theory’ (9, italics added). Particularly problematic, in his opinion, is 
its ‘tendency to treat it [i.e. crisis] as a static concept’ (9, italics added), thereby 
preventing a number of both classical and contemporary sociologists from recognizing 
that crisis constitutes ‘an open field of struggles’ (9, italics added). Far from being reducible 
to a matter of structural determinacy, crises in the social world – in terms of both their 
causes and their consequences – are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Cordero grapples with the pitfalls and shortcomings of ‘the  normalization  
of  the  Marxist  concept of crisis’ (9, italics added) – notably, when it is being used as a 
reductionist conceptual tool within determinist accounts of capitalist society. Criticisms 
of such reductive explanatory frameworks, common within different variants of ‘vulgar 
Marxism’ (Vulgärmarxismus), became increasingly influential in the aftermath of the 
student revolts that took place in May 1968. It is ironic, however, that neo-conservative 
  
 
scholars and politicians subsequently succeeded in re-appropriating the concept of crisis, 
by using collective experiences of social, political, and economic instability as ‘an 
ideological tool of government in the 1970s and 1980s’ (9). It seems, then, that 
legitimation crisis – as it was famously described by Habermas in one of  his  earlier  
books  (see  Habermas  [1973]  1988) – became not an obstacle to but, rather, an 
indispensable vehicle of adjustment, restructuration, and transformation for advanced 
capitalist societies. No less important than its normalization, however, is the dissolution 
of the concept of crisis, which, in Cordero’s view, ‘gained terrain with the advance of 
postmodern and global sociologies’ (9, italics  added). 
Chapter 2 – entitled ‘The crisis of critique: From Hegel to Luhmann’ (38–57) – aims to 
complete the picture by telling ‘the other side of the story’ (38; see also 9). In this 
chapter,  we are confronted with the rationale, implications, and consequences  of  the  
so-called ‘crisis of critique’ (see 38–57), which it has become increasingly popular to 
announce, and also to denounce, in contemporary social theory (cf. Frère 2015). Such 
disillusionment with the emancipatory promise of social critique and social criticism, 
articulated by different versions of critical theory, coincides – as Cordero contends – with 
the ‘domestication of critique’s disruptive potential in social life’ (10, italics added). To the 
extent that critique is incorporated into the mainstream mode of functioning, that is, to 
the extent that critique becomes an integral ingredient of hegemonic behavioural, 
ideological, and institutional patterns in stratified societies, it risks losing its 
transformative and subversive potential. Taking Cordero’s account  a step  further, we  
may  argue that  ‘the  spirit  of  critique’ can  be assimilated into ‘the new spirit of 
capitalism’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999)2 and, arguably, into ‘the new spirit’ of all 
foundational forms of social domination – such as classism (class), sexism (gender), 
racism (‘race’ and ethnicity), ageism (age), and ableism (capacity). What Cordero is even 
more concerned about in this context, however, is the danger that sociological 
approaches may end up turning ‘the practice of critique away from the experience of 
crisis’ (10, italics added), as epitomized in systematic – above all, political – ‘attempts at 
giving normative closure to social life’ (10, italics added). Drawing on the works of both 
Hegel and Adorno, Cordero insists that ‘our capacities to crack open society’s fragile 
foundations’ (10, italics added) are the ultimate – and, arguably, anthropological – resource 
by means of which the imposition of different forms and different degrees of closure 
can be both critiqued and subverted. 
 
2.2. Part II 
Part II is entitled ‘Models of crisis/forms of critique’ (59–100). In this part, Cordero 
proposes to embark upon a somewhat unorthodox journey – namely, the attempt to 
combine and to cross-fertilize two seemingly antithetical approaches to making sense of 
the dialectical relationship between crisis and critique: Habermas’ critical theory and 
Koselleck’s conceptual history. 
Chapter 3 – entitled ‘Diremption of social life: Bringing capitalist crisis and social 
critique back together – Jürgen Habermas’ (61–78) – explores the relationship between 
crisis and critique by focusing on ‘the paradoxes of rationalization processes in capitalist societies’ 
(10, italics added). According to Habermas, critical capacity is embedded in, and derived 
 
 
from, our communicative capacity: as subjects capable of speech and action, we develop 
our ability to form critical judgments about particular aspects of our existence by 
communicating, and reasoning, with one another.3 In  Cordero’s  opinion,  however,  the  
problem with Habermas’ approach is that it is ‘one-sided’ (10, italics added), in the sense 
that it portrays critique as a reaction to, and a product of, crisis. Consequently, it fails to 
account for  the fact that, in many cases, ‘critique actually initiates, enacts and furthers the 
moment of crisis’ (10, italics added; see also 63), rather than merely responding to it. 
Chapter 4 – entitled ‘The non-closure of human history: The vicissitudes of social 
critique and the political foundations of concepts – Reinhart Koselleck’ (79–100) – 
examines the relationship between crisis and critique by reconsidering a  significant  
historical  dynamic: ‘the revolutionary dialectic between bourgeois social criticism and the 
political crisis of absolutism’ (10, italics added). From a historical perspective, this 
example is indicative of the degree to which different forms of critique can trigger different 
forms of crisis. To be sure, this is not to suggest that the relationship between crisis and 
critique can be reduced to a one-way process. Just as crisis can trigger critique, critique 
can trigger crisis. The work of the German historian Koselleck – notably, his Critique and 
crisis: Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society ([1959] 1988) – serves as a starting  
point  to  illustrate not  only ‘the practical  involvement  of  critique in  political life’ (10) 
but also ‘the crisis-ridden processes it [i.e. critique] helps to unfold’ (10). An ‘excess 
of utopianism’ (10, italics added) can have catastrophic consequences to the extent 
that it fosters ‘the impulses that drive critique away from the political struggles  for 
interpretation that crisis situations open and intensify’ (10). Not dissimilar to 
postmodern attacks on, and deconstructions of, metanarratives, Koselleck’s defence 
of the idea of ‘the non-closure of history’ (10) is motivated by his radical opposition 
to ‘any political claim to close the world around one principle’ (10) – that is, to any 
attempt at reducing realities of multiplicity, heterogeneity, and complexity to 
imaginaries of monolithic determinacy. 
 
2.3. Part III 
Part III is entitled ‘Fragile foundations/political struggles’ (101–52). This part 
scrutinizes the relationship between crisis and critique by taking into consideration 
two large-scale phenomena, both of which profoundly shaped the history of the 
twentieth century: the rise of totalitarianism and the rise of neoliberalism. 
Chapter 5 – entitled ‘The fragile world in-between: Totalitarian destruction and the 
modesty of critical thinking – Hannah Arendt’ (103–27) – grapples with the relationship 
between crisis and critique by problematizing the historical experience of 
totalitarianism. According to Arendt’s phenomenological interpretation, ‘the totalitarian 
experience’ (10) can be regarded as ‘the crisis of our century’ (10, italics added) par 
excellence. In fact, in the history of humanity, totalitarianism ranks among the most 
radical experiences of crisis – that is, of a civilizational era whose brutality and barbarism 
oblige critical commentators to call the very foundations of the human condition into 
question. Cordero offers a brilliant discussion of Arendt’s controversial assertion that ‘in 
times of  political  emergency  the power of critique lies in its “modesty” rather than in its 
radicalism’ (11, italics added). 
  
 
Chapter 6 – entitled ‘Making things more fragile: The persistence of crisis and the 
neoliberal disorder of things – Michel Foucault’ (128–52) – analyses the relationship 
between crisis and critique by problematizing the very possibility of governmentality. In 
Cordero’s judgment, Foucault’s genealogical account of liberalism, although the concept 
of crisis appears to play a minor role in it, provides valuable insights into the functioning 
of ‘a new economy of power’ (11). Within liberal and neoliberal regimes of power, crisis 
is not only converted into an object of normative and scientific inquiry, but also used in 
order to shape political agendas. Indeed, as Cordero maintains, ‘neoliberalism mobilizes 
crisis’ (11), permitting it to engage in the ‘re-programing’ (11) of social life according to 
systemic imperatives. At the same time, within the most sophisticated versions of ‘the 
neoliberal governmental matrix’ (11; see also 129 and 145), there is sufficient room for 
critique especially, when confronted with, or when seeking to provoke, a crisis – ‘to make 
truth  and power more fragile’ (11). Put differently, crisis and critique are not only  part 
of the  story of social domination but also part of the story of human emancipation. 
In both chapters, then, Cordero is concerned with the degree to which critique 
enables historically situated subjects ‘to struggle against the logic of ideological closure of meaning 
and action’ (11, italics added) – a logic that underlies both ‘nation-based utopias of 
totalitarianism’ (11; see also 95) and ‘market-based utopias of neoliberal capitalism’ (11; 
see also 95). Despite the numerous differences  that exist  between Arendt  and  
Foucault, the  two scholars are – in Cordero’s eyes – united by their radical anti-
foundationalism. Hence,  they share the  following conviction: if  the  modern house of  
being is  based on any kind of foundations, these foundations are fragile. 
 
2.4. Postscript 
The Postscript is entitled ‘Decoding social hieroglyphics: Notes on the philosophical 
actuality of sociology – Theodor Adorno’ (153–61). As Cordero explains, it is no accident 
that his book does not contain a ‘Conclusion’ in the conventional sense, since this would 
defeat the point of the entire study: namely, the ambition to face up to ‘the impossibility of 
closure of the social’ (11, italics added; see also 38 and 154). Drawing on Adorno’s essay 
‘Society’ ([1968] 1972), this chapter is an attempt to make a case for both ‘the 
sociological actuality of philosophy’ (see 160, 161n27, and 162) and ‘the philosophical 
actuality of sociology’  (see x, 11, 153, 155, and 160), the simultaneous recognition of 
which compels us to overcome  the  ‘false  dilemma’ (see  7,  155,  and 160)  between 
sociology and philosophy. In an emphatically anti-positivist tone, Cordero contends  that  
such  a  transdisciplinary  endeavour must involve ‘the right  to  speculation’ (see  11  and  
158)  – regardless  of  whether this epistemic privilege is exercised by insisting on the 
foundations of fragility or the fragility of foundations (or both). 
 
  
 
 
 
3. Key arguments 
 
3.1. Crisis  and critique 
The main assumption underlying Cordero’s study is that ‘crisis and critique are both 
concepts deeply intertwined with moments of rupture’ (1, italics added). More specifically, 
the book aims to explore ‘the relationship between the experience of crisis and the practice 
of critique’ (1, italics added), insisting that these two essential elements of social life are 
interdependent. In other words, rather than subscribing to the mainstream view that 
critique tends to be a product of crisis, Cordero reminds us that, in a fundamental sense, 
crisis can be a product of critique. As the author demonstrates, this twofold movement 
applies, in particular, to the tension-laden relationship between social crisis and social  
critique. 
 
3.2. Sociality and performativity 
In Cordero’s eyes, ‘[s]ocial life is a delicate and complex achievement’ (1, italics added). 
Thus, the performative constitution of human existence is inextricably linked to the 
instability and indeterminacy  that  are  built  into  our  ontological condition  as  a  
species. As Cordero posits, ‘the seemingly unitary and durable character of the social 
world is inherently fragile, without fixed and ultimate foundations’ (1, italics added). In 
his view, such a sense – and, arguably, also presence – of fragility is a ubiquitous feature 
of social  life, even (or, perhaps, especially) if it is not always directly observable. It lurks 
in the background, until ‘the world around us’ (1, italics added) – or, as he forgot to add, 
the world within us – ‘becomes problematic and loses its character as a unitary and 
natural phenomenon’ (1, italics added). This is the moment of crisis, which, by definition, 
‘interrupts the continuity of what appears solid, justified and functional’ (1, italics 
added). Crisis, in this sense, is inextricably linked to moments of questioning: ‘where are 
we, what is going on, what went wrong, how [can we] get out of here?’ (1, quotation 
modified). 
 
3.3. Abstraction and concreteness 
Crisis obliges us to pose the most fundamental questions about the constitution, 
development, (dys)functionality, and  future prospects of a particular aspect, or 
particular aspects, of our existence. For Cordero, the crucial consequence of crisis, 
therefore, is that it ‘breaks the silence of things and interrupts the sense of completion of the world’ 
(1, italics added) – that is, it puts us in a position in which we are confronted with the task 
of calling the taken-for-grantedness of particular aspects of our existence  into  question.  
The  experience  of crisis, irrespective of whether it is individual or collective, requires us 
to convert ‘the implicit’ into ‘the explicit’, ‘the hidden’ into ‘the overt’, ‘the intuitive’ into 
‘the discursive’, ‘the normal’ into ‘the problematic’,  ‘the accepted’ into ‘the 
questioned’.4 
 
  
 
Cordero’s boldest assertion in this regard is as follows: ‘Without such moments that 
provoke questions [ … ] social life becomes a dangerous abstraction; it consolidates the appearance of 
being a reality without question’ (1, italics added). On this account, Cordero makes not 
only the ‘soft’ claim that moments of crisis are vital ingredients of human life forms, but 
also the ‘strong’ claim that the latter would be reduced to perilous abstractions – devoid 
of meaningful actions and socio-hermeneutic accomplishments – without the  presence  
of  the former. 
In a philosophical sense, experiences of crisis are a strong reminder of the fact that 
‘the unity of society is never attained once and for all’ (2, italics added). As such, they 
highlight the extent to which key (arguably, Durkheimian) ingredients of social order – 
such as social cohesion, social integration, social identity, social belonging, social 
solidarity, and collective consciousness – are spatiotemporally contingent achievements, 
which, despite their enormous normative force, can never be taken for granted and are 
always potentially fragile. 
 
3.4. Objectivity and subjectivity 
Warning his readers that it would be a mistake to treat the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’ 
interchangeably, Cordero insists that they  possess  fundamentally  different  meanings: 
‘whilst crisis designates an objective experience or situation, critique refers to a practice performed 
by subjects’ (2, italics added). Whereas the concept of ‘crisis’ stands for a factually 
existent condition, the concept of ‘critique’ describes a performative accomplishment of 
ordinary actors. Notwithstanding the question of how subjective, biased,  partial,  
prejudiced, or perspectival an actor’s critique may be, it must – when attributing 
meaning to the experience of crisis – make reference to an objectively existing reality in 
order to succeed in making a claim to epistemic validity. Critique, understood in  this  
way, ‘appears as a subjective response to the contradictions and problems  that the  
crisis situation reveals’ (2). Insofar as it is empirically grounded and rationally sustained, 
critique cannot simply ‘invent’ or ‘fabricate’ evidence in support of its legitimacy; rather, 
it presupposes that the series of events or the state of affairs to which it refers does exist 
in the present or at least did exist in the past. 
 
3.5. Unity  and divorce 
Throughout the book, Cordero insists on the socio-ontological significance of the fact 
that, within the daily construction of human life forms, crisis and critique are intimately 
interrelated. On this interpretation, we must avoid falling into the trap of  a double 
reduction:  just as it would be mistaken to reduce ‘critique’ to a mere reaction to or derivative of ‘crisis’, it 
would be erroneous to reduce ‘crisis’ to a sheer upshot of ‘critique’. It is crucial to recognize that, even if 
in some situations one may precede – if not, trigger – the existence of the other, crisis 
and critique are intrinsically intertwined. 
There are, however, ‘instances of divorce between the experience of crisis and the practice of 
critique’ (2, italics added). For example, if the practice of critique is converted into a self-
referential act arising from ‘the inwardness of pure  subjectivity’ (2),  disconnected  from 
‘the practical struggles of life’ (2), then – although it may have personal, or even 
 
 
psychoanalytic, value – it will not be able to establish a meaningful relationship with 
the social world. In a similar vein, if the experience of crisis is not accompanied by critical 
reflection, then it is reduced to an immersive state of real or potential suffering, without 
containing the potential of being problematized, let alone transcended, by those directly 
or indirectly affected by it. Put differently, the experience of crisis and the practice of 
critique have to go hand in hand, in order to ensure that the latter can provide the 
cognitive, evaluative, and projective resources that are necessary to face up to – and, if 
possible, to resolve – the challenges posed by the former. 
 
3.6. Normalization and subversion 
One key issue with which Cordero grapples throughout the book is the problem of 
normalization. Ironically, processes of normalization constitute not only a central feature 
of social life but also a vital element of experiences of crisis and practices of critique themselves. 
There is no society without normalization processes because human life forms  are 
inconceivable without the codification of behavioural, ideological, and institutional 
patterns, to which we generally refer as ‘culture’. The moment in which experiences of 
crisis or practices of critique  become  normalized,  however,  the  former  are  converted  
into a habitual facet of social life, whilst the latter are in danger of losing their analytical, 
let alone imaginative or subversive, force. As Cordero explicitly acknowledges, 
‘strategies of normalization are part of the inbuilt practical rationality that actors put at 
work in everyday life and which is necessary for the construction of a common world’ (3, 
italics added). These strategies – or, rather, habits – of normalization serve a species-
constitutive function, in the sense that the regulation of social life forms would be 
inconceivable without the existence of normalized and normalizing  activities.  To  the  
degree that these  normalization  processes  perpetuate  logics  of  domination,  however,  
they contribute to the reproduction, as well as to the tacit legitimization, of asymmetrical 
power  structures. 
 
3.6.1. Excursus on ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ (réalité) 
Referring to social phenomenology, Cordero draws attention to another key  
sociological – and, arguably, existential – function of normalization processes: they 
‘reduce dissonances that may appear between our conceptions of the world and how the world 
presents itself in specific forms and situations’ (3, italics added). What springs to mind, in 
light of this reflection, is Luc Boltanski’s distinction between ‘world’ (monde) and ‘reality’ 
(réalité).5 The world is ‘everything that is the case’ (Boltanski  [2009]  2011,  57)6,  whereas 
reality encompasses ‘everything that is constructed’ (cf. Boltanski [2009] 2011, 57). Put 
differently, the world is ‘everything  that  happens  to  people’  (Susen  [2012]  2014, 184, 
italics in original), and reality is ‘everything that is constructed by people’  (Susen [2012] 
2014, 184, italics in original). The world is a sphere that exists beyond our will and 
regardless of our intentions, whereas reality is a domain  that  exists  through our will and 
because of our intentions. The key issue in this respect, however, concerns situations in 
which ‘world’ and ‘reality’ are out of sync or in which – to use Cordero’s vocabulary – there 
is a dissonance between them. We construct a ‘reality’  and, as hermeneutic beings, do so 
  
 
normatively and/or subjectively; at the same time, we inhabit a ‘world’ full of 
occurrences and, as physical beings, do so objectively. Yet, as soon as our normative 
and/or subjective construction of ‘reality’ is  manifestly at odds  with the objective 
constitution of the ‘world’, that is, as soon as the ways in which reality is assembled 
normatively and/or subjectively are significantly out of sync with the ways  in which the 
‘world’ presents itself to us objectively, experiences of crisis and practices of critique become 
imminent. The reason for this is that these moments of dissonance or discrepancy 
between ‘world’ and ‘reality’ tend to lead to experiences of crisis, insofar as they 
undermine our expectations by throwing actors into unknown and potentially 
destabilizing territory, and tend to trigger practices of critique, insofar as actors can  make 
sense of changing  circumstances  only  by  revising  their  previous  presuppositions and  
corresponding  parameters  of  validity. 
 
3.7. Reproduction  and transformation 
Drawing the reader’s attention to ‘the post-Hegelian tradition of critical theory’ (4 and 
92), Cordero reminds us that the relationship between crisis and critique plays a pivotal 
role in the analysis of capitalist society, especially in relation to the ‘diagnosis of systemic 
problems’ (4, italics added; see also 82) that are indicative of ‘its tendencies to reproduce’ 
(4, italics added) – and, arguably, also to transform – ‘through recurrent crises’ (4, italics 
added). On this account, periodic crises constitute not only an immanent  feature  of  
capitalist  society but also an indispensable vehicle for its systemic adjustments to 
constantly evolving – and often both economically and politically challenging – 
circumstances. Critique, therefore, can be conceived of as a form of ‘crisis consciousness’ 
(4, 33, 72, and 142), enabling historically situated subjects to expose, and to 
problematize, the limitations of their  behavioural,  ideological,  and  institutional  modes  
of functioning. 
To a greater or lesser extent, then, it is by virtue of critique that subjects capable of  
speech and self-justification can call ‘the logic of closure of meaning and  action’ (4, italics 
added) into question. Ironically, though, they can do so to contribute to (a) the 
reproduction, (b) the transformation, or (c) both the reproduction and the transformation of a 
specific set of social arrangements and state of affairs. In the case of capitalism, the 
dynamic relationship between crisis and critique underlies the simultaneous 
reproduction and transformation of its own logic of functioning: its foundational logic of 
functioning (which is based on its essential ingredients) tends to be confirmed and 
reproduced by crises, whereas its contingent logic of functioning (which changes across 
time and in different contexts) tends to be undermined and transformed by crises. The 
former concerns the nature of capitalism, whereas the latter manifests itself in different 
spirits of capitalism. 
At the foundational level, for instance, capitalism is driven by four geo-economic 
dynamics: 
(a) the creation of new markets of production, distribution, and consumption; (b) the 
expansion of capital across the globe; (c) the borderless exploitation of labour power 
as ‘human capital’; and (d) the tapping of raw materials and natural resources in 
different parts of  the world. (Susen 2015, 125, italics added) 
 
 
These dynamics are built into the very nature of capitalism – that is, no capitalist 
system can function without them. How these dynamics are historically realized, 
however, differs between – spatiotemporally speciﬁc – types, contexts, and ‘spirits’ 
of capitalism. Thus, at the contingent level, capitalism functions, and responds to 
crises, in variable ways. 
 
3.8. Construction  and deconstruction 
Drawing upon Marx, Cordero stresses the significance of the fact that ‘society is no solid 
crystal’ (4, italics added, quotation modified; see also i, 19, and 32; in addition, see Marx 
[1867] 2000/1977, 455). Any attempt to convert  the  whole  of  society  into  ‘a  crystal 
palace’ (4; see also 5),  reducible to  ‘a conservatory for commodity exchange and  an 
exhibition piece of capitalist excess’ (4), is futile in the sense that the very forces of its 
construction may turn out to be the forces of its own destruction (and, as Marxist 
environmentalists would add, the forces of environmental destruction). Paradoxically, 
as the Japanese philosopher and  literary critic  Kōjin  Karatani – to  whose work  Cordero 
refers  in this context – remarks, ‘the “will to construct a solid  edifice”  ultimately  does  
not achieve a foundation, but reveals instead the very absence of its own foundation’ 
(Karatani [1983] 1995, 8; see also Cordero 2017, 5). In other words, there would be no 
point in trying to erect solid foundations if they were already built into the social fabric, 
let alone into capitalism. The metaphor of the ‘Crystal Palace’ conveys the Marxist 
conviction that capitalist society is tantamount to a ‘crystal-like’ (5; see also 27) historical 
formation, whose destiny is one of apparent indestructibility and actual self-
destructibility. On this view, ‘fragility is a condition inscribed in the very core of the 
sociological idea of modern society’ (5, italics added). Far from representing a peripheral 
element or exceptional epiphenomenon of modern life, fragility constitutes ‘an 
ontological property of social life  as  a  mode  of existence’ (5) shaped  by material and 
symbolic processes  of construction  and deconstruction. 
 
3.9. Relationality and fragility 
Another crucial proposition underlying Cordero’s argument is the contention that  ‘the 
fragile condition of the social world is a result of its relational foundation’ (5, italics 
added). Put differently, the fragility of the social and the relationality of the social not 
only go hand in hand, but the former stems from the latter. Cordero describes his 
relationalist conception of social fragility as follows: 
If we understand the social as a principle of coexistence (that is, a mode of proximity and 
being-together), relation is what defines the structure of the social world from the very 
beginning. This structure basically consists of the unity between qualitatively different entities 
which were not originally united and therefore could separate. Seen in this way, social 
theory confronts the problem that in order to elucidate what makes possible the unity and 
relative solidness of life in common, it must examine at the same time what interrupts and 
tears it apart. (5, italics added) 
What is perhaps more important, however, is that – in Cordero’s verdict – such a 
relationalist mode of conceptualizing fragility obliges us to acknowledge that the 
  
 
quest for foundationalist forms of unity is doomed to failure, owing to the relational 
constitution of society: 
The definition of society as a form of relation then suggests that the social is a mode of 
coexistence whose unity is constituted in the absence of unity. Therefore, it lacks a substantial 
foundation, original identity or absolute destiny. In fact, the social means a relentless 
opening of existence toward the other and, therefore, the always-present possibility of 
estrangement, fissure and divorce. (5–6, italics added) 
In short, the anti-foundationalist nature of critical theory emanates from the foundationless 
constitution of its main object of study: society. This insight requires us to recognize that the ‘in-
itselfness’ and the ‘for-itselfness’ of the social world are inextricably linked: for us, as 
subjects capable of both action and interpretation, the universe is not only what it is (‘in-
it-selfness’) but also what we make of, and how we attribute meaning to, it (‘for-itselfness’). It is 
precisely in moments of crisis that, by virtue of critique, worldly ‘in-itselfness’ is bestowed 
with meaning through socio-cognitive ‘for-itselfness’. Indeed, as Cordero puts it, ‘the 
world torn apart demands new attention – it acquires consciousness of itself as world’ (6, 
italics added): it is only through its protagonists’ awareness of themselves and of their 
environment that it can constitute, and constantly re-constitute, itself in a meaningful and 
purposive fashion. Hermeneutically inspired actors, then, are regularly confronted with 
the challenge of turning crisis not only into an object of critique but also into an 
existential opportunity. 
 
3.9.1. Excursus on the ‘middle space’ between crisis and critique 
For Cordero, fragility is not a negative feature, let alone a weakness, of social existence 
in particular or of the human condition in general. Rather, in a positive sense of individual 
and/or collective empowerment, it is ‘the price to be paid’ (6, italics added) – not only ‘for 
refusing all forms of transcendence and accepting the relational constitution of the social 
world’ (6), but also ‘for wishing to break free from the dominance of pure immanence and the 
closure of meaning and action’ (6, italics added). This reflection enables Cordero to make a 
powerful case for the insight that crisis and critique, far from being situated at two 
opposite ends of the sociological matrix, unfold both within and through ‘the emergent 
middle space where the social opens itself to question’ (6, italics added). 
Cordero rightly insists, however, that the socio-ontological centrality of the 
relationship between crisis and critique manifests itself in both empirical and 
conceptual moments of social life: 
(a) At the empirical level, the interaction between crisis and critique is shaped by 
human practices that are spatiotemporally situated ‘in concrete historical and 
institutional contexts’ (6). 
(b) At the conceptual level, the interaction between crisis and critique constitutes a 
major object of inquiry – not only for critical theorists but also, in a more 
fundamental sense, for ordinary actors as they grapple with the tensions, 
frictions, and disappointments of their everyday lives. 
In brief, the dynamic relationship between crisis and critique is vital to both the 
material and the symbolic construction of social reality. 
 
 
 
3.10. Philosophy and sociology 
On several occasions throughout the book, Cordero insists that the alleged 
disciplinary gap between philosophy and sociology is based on an erroneous, and 
largely counterproductive, antinomy. On this account, ‘the conventional distinction 
between conceptual thought and empirical inquiry […] creates a false dilemma between 
philosophy and sociology’ (7, italics added). Such a misleading dichotomous 
understanding of the two disciplines is founded on the following presuppositional 
opposition: 
 
 On the one hand, philosophy is concerned, above all, with the ‘reflection on and 
creation of concepts’ (7, italics added), implying that the study of the genealogy 
of their meaning is crucial to this kind of theoretical investigation. 
 On the other hand, sociology is concerned, primarily, with society, implying that 
the study of both its constitution and its development is central to this form of 
empirical analysis. 
 
In Cordero’s view, such a binary approach prevents us from grasping the degree to 
which it may be possible ‘to obtain sociological knowledge from an inquiry [into] concepts’ 
(7, italics added, quotation modified), thereby overlooking the fact that ‘concepts 
themselves may be sociological objects in their own right’ (7). What may be added to 
Cordero’s argument is that, in a similar vein, such a separatist division of labour 
precludes us from recognizing that it may be viable to acquire philosophical knowledge 
from an inquiry into society. Thus, Cordero converges with Bourdieusian – and, indeed, 
many other transdisciplinary – scholars in insisting that, for critical social researchers, it 
is essential to move beyond the false antagonism between different modes of 
knowledge production and to transcend the ‘apparent antinomy’ between them 
(Bourdieu 1980, 46, italics added, my translation; cf. Susen 2007, esp. 149–50). The 
Bourdieusian conviction that  ‘research  without theory is blind, and theory without 
research is empty’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant  1992, 162, italics removed)7 falls squarely 
in line with Cordero’s contention that the divide between  philosophy  and  sociology  is 
misleading. 
 
3.11. The sociology of concepts and the conceptuality of sociology 
Setting out the presuppositional underpinnings of his study, Cordero aims to make a 
case for a paradigm shift: 
In the following chapters, I intend to leave aside the impression that concepts of crisis and 
critique are intellectual products of subjective imagination, mere representations of pre-
constituted definitions, or essential unities of meaning with secure foundations. This 
supposes an important change of perspective: from understanding concepts as mere classificatory 
tools that help us measure social regularities to understanding concepts as constellations of elements 
apparently dispersed in social life. Put differently, concepts are crystallizations of the way in 
which social relations are historically organized. (7–8, italics added) 
  
 
The aforementioned paradigm shift has three crucial  implications: 
 
(a) Within the discursive domain of social theory, every concept is a ‘reconstruction’ (8, 
italics added; see also 68 and 73) and, as such, ‘an essentially contestable and 
transformable unity of meaning’ (8, italics added). Consequently, concepts  do  not  
possess ‘a principle of closure’ (8; see also 4, 32, and 146), they ‘can never be self-
sufficient and coherent unities of meaning’ (8), but they emerge and evolve within 
and through ‘spaces of struggle and social forms open to question’ (8, italics added). 
(b) Within the empirical realm of social existence, all concepts are shaped by human 
practices. In this sense, ‘they stand neither a priori nor ex post facto but in the 
middle of social life’ (8). Concepts, as they develop in relation to socio-
historically situated activities, can be regarded as ‘the crystallization of certain 
experiences’ (8) – that is, as expressions of people’s daily immersion in the 
world. 
(c) Within the epistemological province of the sociology of knowledge, it is vital to 
examine concepts not as isolated units but, in a Saussurean fashion, in terms of the 
‘relationship between them’ (8, italics added). In the context of Cordero’s study, this 
means that it is futile to pretend ‘one can think crisis without critique and critique 
without crisis’ (8, italics added). For we need to shed light on the links between them 
in order to ‘be able to grasp social diremptions’ (8, italics added) – that is, processes 
that are aimed at ripping apart elements of social life that essentially belong 
together. 
 
 
3.12. The tripartite challenge of critical theory 
For Cordero, critical theory can claim to be truly ‘critical’ only insofar as it is committed 
to three levels of self-understanding: 
 
(a) It is ‘materially grounded’ (6, italics added), in the sense that it sheds light on the 
multifaceted ways in which ‘social relations are objectively produced and  
transformed’  (6), thereby presupposing that they exist as empirically verifiable and 
conceptually graspable realities. 
(b) It is ‘phenomenologically invested’ (6, italics added), in the sense that it engages with 
people’s quotidian experiences of the world, including their ‘everyday struggles for 
interpretation’ (6) and recognition, in which they, as hermeneutic entities, are 
inevitably involved. 
(c) It is ‘genealogically deployed’ (6, italics added), in the sense that it fleshes out ‘the 
historical constitution of practices, norms and institutions that hold social relations  
together’ (6), or indeed transform them, thereby demonstrating that all modes of 
individual or social abstraction are embedded in spatiotemporal horizons of 
concrete human  actions. 
 
 
 
In brief, critical theory constitutes a materially grounded, phenomenologically 
invested, and genealogically deployed endeavour, in the sense that it is committed 
not only to studying the objective, subjective, and normative dimensions of 
existence, but also to exposing the extent to which they perpetuate relations of 
domination and thereby undermine the potential of human emancipation. 
 
 
4. Limitations 
Let me now turn to the task of shedding light on the most significant weaknesses and 
limitations of Cordero’s Crisis and critique. 
 
4.1. Definitions: ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’? 
It is striking that, in the introductory section of – and, in fact, throughout – the book, 
Cordero does not provide definitions of the concepts of ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’. The same 
applies not only to the concept of ‘foundations’, which features centrally in the subtitle 
of his book, but also to various other concepts that appear on several pages and in crucial 
passages – such as ‘abstraction’, ‘actuality’, ‘assemblage’, ‘closure’/‘non-closure’, 
‘diremption’, ‘essentialist’/‘non-essentialist’, ‘freedom’, ‘postmodern’, ‘reality’, 
‘uncertainty’, ‘utopia’, or ‘validity’. Granted, some of these concepts are notoriously 
difficult to define, which is precisely what makes them sociologically interesting and 
epistemically controversial. To the extent that they constitute presuppositional 
cornerstones of Cordero’s theoretical architecture, however, it is vital to offer at least 
shorthand definitions, so that the  reader knows what the author has in mind when 
employing these terms in his analysis.  To be fair, Cordero may  legitimately  argue  that  
providing  shorthand  definitions  of the two key foundational concepts of his study – that 
is, ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’– would defeat the point of producing an almost 200-page volume 
on  their meaning, significance, and role in sociological inquiry. Yet, even if  his  in-depth  
investigation  demonstrates  that  these terms can be, and have been, used and described 
in a large variety of ways, it would have been beneficial to  include  at  least  minimalist  
definitions  of  them,  thereby not only ‘setting the scene’ but also providing an 
epistemically valuable ground for subsequent reflections. 
 
4.2. Key thinkers: (a) similarities, (b) differences, and (c) integration? 
A fundamental three-step challenge with which we are confronted when comparing and 
contrasting rival approaches to a particular topic consists in identifying (a) affinities and 
commonalties, (b) differences and discrepancies, as well as (c) points of integration and cross-fertilization.  
Tasks (a) and (b) are merely scholastic endeavours if they fail to demonstrate what can 
be gained – theoretically and/or practically – from (c). Cordero’s study succeeds in 
comparing and contrasting insightful accounts of ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’ within individual 
chapters, but it contains little in the way of a decisive attempt at cross-fertilizing, let alone 
integrating, these approaches in a systematic manner. Such a task could have been 
  
 
undertaken in an additional (penultimate or final) chapter, in order for the reader to 
know how contemporary social and political thought can benefit – theoretically and/or 
practically – from Cordero’s previous analysis. Far from constituting a scholastic 
exercise of intellectualist posturing, such a threefold undertaking – for which it is 
essential that concepts be clearly and concisely defined – would have permitted the 
author to push the debate forward, thereby taking our understanding of the 
relationship between crisis and critique to an epistemically superior level. 
 
4.3. Contribution:  alternative outline? 
Sympathetic readers may applaud Cordero’s decision not to provide a ‘Conclusion’ in the 
conventional sense, as the orderly formulation of a set of definitive and categorical 
statements in the final chapter would have defeated the whole point of his normative 
enterprise, consisting in the uncompromising insistence on  the  radical  ‘openness’  –  
and,  hence, ‘non-closure’ and ‘indeterminacy’ – of the social  universe.  Indeed,  
Cordero’s  entire project is driven by  the ambition to face up to – and  by the motivation 
to urge his readers to accept – ‘the impossibility of closure of the social’ (11, italics added; 
see also  38  and  154).  A  crucial  dimension  that,  in  my  view,  the  book  falls  short  
of, however, is to accomplish precisely what Cordero shied away from accomplishing in 
the  final section of his study: namely, to develop his own approach – that is, an approach 
that, whilst drawing on and borrowing from numerous other sources, distinguishes itself 
from already existing conceptual frameworks. Cordero’s explicit and detailed defence of 
his own perspective would have enabled him to make an original contribution to our 
understanding of crisis and critique. 
 
4.4. Normalization: habit or strategy (or  both)? 
On numerous occasions, Cordero grapples with the issue of ‘normalization’ (see iii, 3, 
8–9, 16, 22–7, 31–2, 38, 51, and 118), notably in terms of its role in social life. There is 
a tension in his understanding of ‘normalization’, which can be described as follows: 
 On the one hand, he accepts that ‘strategies of normalization are part of the inbuilt 
practical rationality that actors put at work in everyday life and which is necessary 
for the construction of a common world’ (3, italics added). 
 On the other hand, he suggests that normalization processes are deeply 
problematic, insofar as they perpetuate logics of domination and, consequently, 
contribute to the reproduction, as well as the tacit legitimization, of asymmetrical 
power structures.8 
Paradoxically, then, normalization processes are both empowering and 
disempowering. The problem with Cordero’s analysis, however, is that it tends to 
underemphasize the positive and empowering functions and accomplishments, whilst it 
tends to overemphasize the negative and disempowering functions and consequences, 
of normalization processes. Cordero’s preferred wording ‘strategies of normalization’ (3, 
italics added) is misleading – not only because it disregards the fact that habits (rather  
than strategies) of normalization serve a vital species-constitutive function, to the degree 
 
 
that they allow for the emergence of culturally codified forms of action and cognition, but 
also because it erroneously suggests that normalization processes are consciously 
generated, shaped, or designed by instrumentally  motivated,  utility-driven,  and  
outcome-oriented subjects. 
Throughout the book, Cordero has a tendency to fall into the poststructuralist trap of 
portraying any social phenomenon, social force, social structure, or social action that has 
anything remotely to do with ‘normalization’ in a negative light, as if the subject in 
question were reducible to a hegemonically ruled object of power struggles. A more 
nuanced, balanced, and accurate understanding of ‘normalization’ processes is needed 
in order to recognize not only their disempowering aspects but also their empowering 
potential – particularly, in terms of  their  invaluable  contribution  to  sustaining  
culturally  codified  life forms. 
 
4.5. Crisis: norm or exception? 
According to Cordero, one of the key sociological functions of crises is to undermine ‘the 
seemingly unitary and durable character of the social world’ (1, italics added). In this sense, 
they expose the fundamentally non-unitary and non-durable constitution of the human 
universe, demonstrating that it is ‘inherently fragile, without fixed and ultimate 
foundations’ (1,  italics  added).  Not  many  – if  any  – contemporary  sociologists  would 
take issue with this characterization; yet, this crucial reflection, which underlies the main 
argument of the book, needs to be taken a step further. What about those people – that 
is, individual or collective actors – for whom crisis is, or who experience crisis as, the 
norm? 
Consider, for instance, children who grow up in conflict or war zones, or persons who 
– for different reasons – suffer from  mental depression  or personality disorders,  or 
actors  who struggle to make ends meet and live, as deprived citizens or non-citizens,  
on  the  fringes of society. For them, crisis is the norm. For them, the state or experience 
of non-crisis is the exception. In my mind, a truly comprehensive critical theory of crisis 
needs to pay attention to, and to flesh out, what can be learned from those individual 
or collective actors for whom the presence of crisis is a state of normality and for whom the 
absence of crisis is a state of abnormality. Surely, the analysis of almost permanent states of 
crisis, experienced by some individual or collective actors, can be just as enlightening as 
the analysis of relatively transient states of crisis. Whilst different forms of crisis can be 
sources of illumination for both the ordinary actors who experience them and the critical 
researchers who study them, both normality as the absence of crisis and normality as the presence 
of crisis need to be part of the sociological picture. 
 
4.6. Sense of completion? 
Cordero contends that crisis ‘breaks the silence of things and interrupts the sense of 
completion of the world’ (1, italics added). As such, crisis constitutes both a disruptive 
and an unsettling process, putting actors in a position in which they are compelled to call 
the taken-for-grantedness of particular aspects of their existence into question. Again, 
the following question arises: to what extent does this statement apply to individual or 
  
 
collective actors for whom the experience of a state of crisis is the norm, rather than the 
exception? A provocative answer to this question would be to recognize that, for them, 
it is the end of crisis, along with the subsequent experience of non- or post-crisis, which ‘breaks 
the silence of things and interrupts the sense of non-completion of the world’ (see 1, 
italics added, quotation modified). 
It is true that crisis – understood in the conventional sociological sense – usually 
requires us to convert ‘the implicit’ into ‘the explicit’, ‘the hidden’ into ‘the overt’, 
‘the intuitive’ into ‘the discursive’, ‘the normal’ into ‘the problematic’, ‘the 
accepted’ into ‘the questioned’.  It would be a mistake to assume, however, that, in 
our everyday immersion in reality, we enjoy a ‘sense of completion of the world’ (1), 
which is occasionally disrupted by experiences of crisis. Rather, normality, for most of 
us, is the constant experience of non-completion – that is, of longing, aspiring, desiring, 
yearning, imagining, wanting to reach further, seeking to realize unfulfilled dreams, 
and projecting ourselves into a not-yet.9 
On this account, it appears accurate to admit that a ‘sense of completion’ (iii, 1, and 
6) is the exception, arising in moments in which we experience unusually high levels of 
fulfilment, love, and self-realization. Granted, the experience of crisis can interrupt our 
sense of objective, normative, or subjective completion – notably, when we are thrown 
into a situation in which our previous state of relative satisfaction,  contentment,  or 
happiness is  undermined. At the same time, however, the experience of the opposite of 
crisis – such as fulfilment, love, or self-realization – can trigger a sense of completion of 
the world, often up to delusional levels, precisely because our lack of a sense of 
completion of the world is the norm for most of us when immersed in the routine-driven 
mechanics of our everyday lives. 
 
4.7. Social life as a dangerous abstraction? 
As stated above, one of the boldest assertions underlying Cordero’s analysis is the 
following affirmation: ‘Without such moments that provoke questions [ … ] social life becomes a 
dangerous abstraction; it consolidates the appearance of being a reality without question’ (1, italics 
added). To be precise, Cordero makes two claims in this passage: the ‘soft’ claim that 
moments of crisis are vital ingredients of human life forms, and the ‘strong’ claim that the 
latter would be reduced to perilous abstractions – devoid of meaningful actions and socio-
hermeneutic accomplishments – without the presence of the former. Hardly anyone – 
as a critical theorist, critical actor, or otherwise – would seriously call the validity of this 
contention into question. For it is by relating to, attributing meaning to, and acting upon 
the world in a critical manner that human beings, unlike other entities, develop the 
capacity to mobilize their symbolic resources in order to define, and to redefine, their 
place in the world not only as socio-constructive but also as reflexive entities (see Susen 
2007, 287– 92 [section on ‘culture’] and 283–7 [section on ‘language’]). Insofar as our 
critical capacity  is embedded in and derived from our linguistic capacity, the species-
empowering – that is, (a) assertive, (b) normative, (c) expressive, (d) communicative, 
and (e) imaginative – functions of language are crucial to our ability to convert our 
involvement in the world into a daily search for, and struggle over, meaning. 
 
 
One significant aspect of our meaning-laden engagement with the world that 
Cordero appears to overlook, however, is the fact that we tend to enjoy the greatest 
amount of fulfilment, self-realization, and happiness precisely when we do not 
question the experience in which we find ourselves immersed – that is, when we 
‘switch off’ and ‘let go’, without letting our conscious, let alone critical or reflexive, 
control mechanisms get in the way. This is a basic idea one finds in numerous 
paradigmatic approaches, such as the following: 
 
(a) in therapeutic approaches, especially those related to meditation and mindfulness10; 
(b) in philosophical approaches, notably those inspired by Martin Heidegger’s concepts of 
Dasein (being-there) and thrownness or being-thrown-into-the-world11; 
(c) in sociological approaches concerned with different forms of engagement, such as 
those by  Luc  Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot12. 
 
Without these moments – in which actors, even if only temporarily, disregard all 
questions – social life would indeed become ‘a dangerous abstraction’ (1 and 6). In other 
words, both the moments that provoke questions and the moments that dispense with 
questions are essential to the empowering construction of social life. Humans have the 
potential to realize themselves not only by calling particular aspects of their existence 
into question but also, paradoxically, by refraining from doing so, because otherwise life 
would be unbearable  for them. 
One need not be an existentialist to concede that ‘life seems worth living because the 
world seems worth relating to’ (Susen 2007, 292).  Yet,  meaningful  and  concrete  –  
rather than meaningless and abstract – ways of relating to the world can be either 
reflexive or intuitive. It is not only due to our reflexive engagement with the challenging 
and crisis-ridden aspects of our lives, but also by virtue of our intuitive engagement with 
key dimensions of our existence that we have learned to be, and that we continue to 
learn how to be, human. 
 
4.8. ‘Crisis’ and ‘critique’: objective, normative, or subjective? 
Cordero makes it clear that, from his perspective, the terms ‘crisis’ and ‘critique’ must 
not be used interchangeably: ‘whilst crisis designates an objective experience or situation, 
critique refers to a practice performed by subjects’ (2, italics added). On this account, the 
concept of ‘crisis’ stands for a factually existent condition, whereas the concept of 
‘critique’ describes a performative accomplishment of ordinary actors. Critique, 
understood in this  way, ‘appears as a subjective response to the [objective] 
contradictions and problems that the crisis situation reveals’ (2, italics added). 
In light of this description, Cordero is culpable of reducing crisis to an objective state 
of affairs and critique to a subjective performance. Such a dualistic – and, arguably, 
reductive – reading overlooks the extent to which both crisis and critique have (a) 
objective, (b) normative, and (c) subjective dimensions. A crisis may be (a) objectively 
happening, (b) normatively constructed in terms of both its social constitution and its 
  
 
collective perception, and (c) subjectively experienced and perceived by different actors. 
Critique may make reference to, and be formulated from the point of view of, (a) an 
objective  world, (b) a normative world, and (c) a subjective world. Just as all persons are 
simultaneously immersed in spheres of  objectivity,  normativity,  and  subjectivity,  both  
crisis and critique are integral components, as well as developmental forces,  of these 
foundational  domains  of  human reality. 
 
4.9. No closure? 
It is striking that, throughout the  book,  Cordero  engages  both  repeatedly  and  
substantially with the concept of closure. For him, both crisis and critique are indicative 
of the fact that ‘the social world is an open relational space that lacks a principle of closure ’ (8, 
italics added).  It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  Cordero  could  have  been  more  precise 
about the different levels of inquiry in relation to which it is vital to recognize the 
implications of the principle of non-closure or, if one prefers, openness. Indeed, if we 
agree with the gist of Cordero’s argument, then  we may spell out that his attack on the 
illusion of closure and his emphasis on the ubiquity of openness are crucial at three  levels: 
 
(a) At the ontological level, reality is fundamentally open, in the sense that it is in a 
constant state of flux and permeated by the spatiotemporal contingency of  
being. 
(b) At the epistemological level, concepts are fundamentally open, in the sense that they are 
relatively arbitrary to the extent that they are value-, meaning-, perspective-,  
interest-,  and  power-laden. 
(c) At the methodological level, techniques of inquiry are fundamentally open, in the sense 
that the tools by means of which reality is studied are both normatively and 
subjectively constructed, as well as being constantly reconstructed. 
 
The problem with Cordero’s understanding of closure  and openness, however,  is not  
only that it reproduces the  jargon  of  poststructuralism  in  an  overly  derivative  and  
largely unsubstantiated manner, but also that it fails to account for considerable degrees 
and forms of determinacy pervading our existence. 
 
(a) At the ontological level, reality is, in some measure, ‘closed’, in the sense that it is 
shaped by patterns and regularities, which exercise a constraining mode of 
power over both non-human  and human  entities. 
(b) At the epistemological level, concepts are, in some measure, ‘closed’, in the sense that 
they are hermeneutic products of particular historical contexts and shaped by 
numerous civilizational – notably, social, cultural, linguistic, political, ideological, 
and economic – forces of influence. 
(c) At the methodological level, techniques of inquiry are, in some measure, ‘closed’, in the 
sense that the descriptibility of the object depends on the epistemic scope of the 
tools by means of which it is studied. 
 
 
 
In short, instead of buying into the poststructuralist dogma  according  to  which  all  
modes of ontological, epistemological, and methodological ‘closure’ are illusory, 
Cordero’s analysis would have been strengthened if it had been prepared to 
acknowledge the significant degrees and types of determinacy13 that pervade not only 
diverse ‘forms of ideological unanimity’ (4, 91, and 96) but also fundamental constituents 
of human reality. Notwithstanding its inherent fragility, the human universe is shaped by 
an abundance of principles of closure, as expressed in the power of social structures.14 
 
4.10. Epiphenomenalism? 
Cordero confidently announces that ‘a critique of society cannot proceed without a critique of 
concepts’ (8, italics added). It is due to this conviction that he seeks to defend the 
corresponding claim that ‘concepts are small clues to general social problems’ (8, italics added). Not 
many – if any – critical theorists will be opposed to this contention; it is important, 
however, to recognize that its one-sided defence may lead to a form of epiphenomenalist 
reductionism, according to which ‘superstructural’ elements – such as concepts, 
representations, ideology, etc. – are mere products of an underlying social or economic 
‘base’.15 Of course, Cordero is right to insist that concepts must not be reduced to ‘mere 
classificatory tools’ (7) by means of which it is possible to represent, or even to measure, 
specific aspects of reality. 
To interpret all concepts as ‘crystallizations of the way in which social relations are 
historically organized’ (8, italics added), however, is tantamount to a  sociologistic  
reduction, implying  that  semantic  expressions  are  sheer  manifestations  of  particular  
sets of interactional arrangements and, ultimately, of culturally specific modes of 
existence. Granted, all symbolic forms – including concepts – are embedded in 
spatiotemporally contingent contexts of action and interaction, from which they cannot 
be dissociated. This does not mean, however, that the former can be reduced to 
epiphenomena of the latter, as if they stood for little more than ‘symptoms’ of 
underlying social forces. Given the  ‘relative autonomy’16  of  symbolic forms, we  must  
resist the  temptation to  reduce  concepts  to  epiphenomena. 
 
4.11. Cognitivism? 
Any reader familiar with different sociologies of the body will notice that Cordero’s 
analysis  suffers  from  a  cognitivist-rationalist  fallacy,  which  overestimates  the  power  
of consciousness and underestimates the power of the unconscious. The point is not to deny 
that human cognition in general and human rationality in  particular  can  be  regarded 
as  both species-constitutive and species-generative forces of the human condition: as 
species-constitutive forces, they are an integral part of what it means to be human; as 
species-generative forces, they have permitted humans to raise themselves above 
nature on  the  basis  of  reason-guided  actions and interactions. 
When confronting, and seeking to resolve, different forms and degrees of crisis, 
however, individual or collective actors have a large amount of empowering 
approaches at their disposal, some of which break out of the cognitivist straitjacket 
  
 
of rational control. For instance, there are numerous artistic ways (such as music, 
painting, poetry, etc.) in which crises can be thematized, as well as problematized, 
enabling people to  face up to and, if possible, to resolve the personal or social issues 
they may be experiencing. In fact, one may go one step further by suggesting that 
non-human actors – such as animals and plants, but also, in a larger sense, the planet 
– are equipped with evolutionary resources to respond to, to adjust to, and to 
overcome different forms and degrees of crisis. 
 
4.12. Appearance vs. substance? 
At the core of Cordero’s approach lies a great irony. On the one hand, it is anti-essentialist, 
insisting on the constructability and reconstructability of the social world, which,  
ultimately, manifests itself in its fragility. On the other hand, it is – inadvertently – 
essentialist, positing that the social word is  divided  between appearances  and  
substances,  symptoms and causes, visible indications and hidden forces. Indeed, the 
conviction that crisis can be the source of ‘revealing some kind of truth about the social 
world that we are not completely aware of yet or remains hidden under the surface’ (15, 
italics added) is based on the assumption that moments of potential or actual breakdown, 
collapse, and dysfunctionality permit us – not only as critical researchers, but also as 
reflexive actors – to grasp aspects of reality that we would not be able to comprehend 
otherwise. There is ample sociological evidence to substantiate the validity of this claim 
(see Susen 2007, esp. 214-6, 240-1, 251-2; see also Celikates 2009; in addition, see Susen 
2011a, 2016b). Yet, we cannot have it both ways. We cannot seriously maintain that the 
social world represents both a relational construct, constellation, or assemblage without 
any ‘essential’ properties (anti-essentialism) and an interactional conglomerate that is 
divided into an epiphenomenal surface level of appearances and an infrastructural 
substance level of underlying forces (essentialism). If Cordero believes that these two 
positions can logically coexist, he needs to explain  how they  can be reconciled. 
 
 
4.13. Enlightening  vs. blinding? 
One of the most interesting themes developed in Cordero’s book touches upon the 
notion that crises tend to be deeply ambivalent in terms of their consequences. The 
effects of crises can be empowering and disempowering, emancipatory and 
repressive, transformative and reproductive, progressive and regressive, subversive 
and conformative. Thus, different crises can have radically different – and, in several 
respects, contradictory – outcomes, some of which are more desirable and some of 
which are less desirable, depending on how they are interpreted. 
A central issue that, in this respect, Cordero could have explored in  more  detail, 
however, concerns not the normative value but, rather, the epistemic value of crises, 
the latter being no less ambivalent than the former. To put it bluntly: just as crises can 
be enlightening, they can be blinding. Cordero’s book contains numerous valuable reflections 
in relation to the former, but it comprises little in the way of a systematic engagement 
with the latter. Granted, for critical researchers and arguably also for reflexive 
 
 
laypersons, crises can be eye-openers, permitting them to grasp elements of reality 
that appear to be hidden in a state of apparent normality. Adorno’s famous assertion 
that ‘[t]he splinter in your eye is the best magnifying-glass’ ([1951] 1978, 50) captures 
this idea in an aphoristic manner. As sources of epistemically informed revelation, 
crises can make us see things of which we are usually not aware because we take 
them for granted.17 In a scientific sense, crises allow the critical researcher to draw 
attention to underlying states of affairs (forces, structures, mechanisms, logics of 
functioning, etc.), which, in some cases, do not require being uncovered, since, in 
extreme situations of predicament, they become more or less visible to everyone. We 
must not lose sight of the fact, however, that crises can also be blinding. This – 
epistemically less desirable – outcome is reflected in the fact that different actors 
react differently to different crises. In the wake of an economic crisis, some actors 
may blame the economic system (for instance, capitalism or socialism), others the 
economic policy of a government  (for  instance,  monetarism  or  fiscalism),  others  the  
political  system (for instance, liberal democracy  or  autocracy),  and  others  may  blame 
particular sectors of the population (for instance, foreigners, ethnic minorities,  etc.).  In  
other words, the same crisis may provoke very different reactions and lead to radically  
different interpretations. 
Cordero, although he recognizes the normative ambivalence of crises, fails to put his 
finger on the epistemic ambivalence of crisis – which is, of course, also interpretive and, 
ultimately, normative. To the extent that crises can – as Cordero spells out – be 
instrumentalized by the powerful to push through their agendas, they can also – as 
Cordero does not acknowledge – be used by the powerless to blame particular – often 
even more deprived – groups for their misery. The fact that we experience crisis does not mean 
that we understand its effects, let alone its causes. A cursory look at the world-historical 
events of the twentieth century will suffice to demonstrate  that  epistemically  
misguided  judgments  about individual or collective experiences of crisis can have 
disastrous consequences. 
 
 
4.14. Typology? 
Cordero provides a thorough – and, arguably, unprecedented – analysis of the 
relationship between crisis and critique in the  works of  prominent  social  and political  
thinkers. What he fails to develop in his book, however, is a typology of these two 
concepts. Far from representing a merely scholastic exercise, such a typology is crucial 
in that it permits us  to distinguish between key forms of crisis and key forms of critique, 
each of which has idiosyncratic features and each of which needs to be recognized in 
terms of its specificity. 
For instance, crises can be classified as follows: 
 
 objective, normative, or subjective 
 behavioural, ideological, or institutional 
  
 
 foundational, contingent, or ephemeral 
 micro, meso, or macro 
 structural or circumstantial 
 existential or periodic 
 real or imagined 
 transformative or reproductive 
 empowering or disempowering 
 endogenously caused or exogenously caused 
 social, economic, cultural, political, ideological, moral, organizational, 
technological, demographic, civilizational, personal, psychological, 
environmental, natural, etc. 
 
One can think of similar ways to classify critique: 
 
 ordinary or scientific 
 spontaneous or reflexive 
 rudimentary or elaborate 
 radical or moderate 
 transcendent or immanent 
 hostile or sympathetic 
 negative or positive 
 implicit or explicit 
 
If one reflects upon the relationship between crisis and critique in typological terms, 
then the following becomes evident: different types of crisis can trigger different types of 
critique, just as different types of critique can trigger different types of crisis. Unfortunately, 
Cordero’s inquiry contains little in  the  way  of  a  conceptual  framework permitting us 
to differentiate between types of (a) crisis, (b) critique, and (c) crisis–critique 
relationships. Of course, one may argue that, given both its scope and its complexity, 
such an undertaking might  have  required  Cordero  to  write  another  book.  It  would  
have been useful, however, if he had provided at least a tentative outline of such a 
typology in the final chapter, thereby paving the way for a worthwhile intellectual 
project, aimed  at  contributing  to  an  even  more  comprehensive  and  fine-grained  
account  of the relationship between crisis and critique than the one so skilfully 
developed in this study. 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Crisis and critique is one of the most original contributions made to contemporary social 
theory in recent years. The previous analysis has sought to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of Cordero’s study at several levels: 
 
. The first part has made some general observations on the book’s principal strengths. 
What stands out in this regard are (1) its coherent textual organization, (2) its 
impressive scope, (3) its analytical depth, (4) its accessible language, and (5) its 
remarkable contemporary relevance. 
 
. The second part has given a brief overview of the book’s thematic structure. The 
Introduction, the three main Parts, and the Postscript offer astute insights into the 
numerous implications of the fact that the dynamic relationship between crisis 
and critique represents a core concern in the works of major social and political 
thinkers. 
 
. The third part has elucidated the book’s key arguments. These relate to a wide range 
of intellectual issues, such as the following: (1) crisis and critique; (2) sociality and 
performativity; (3) abstraction and concreteness; (4) objectivity and subjectivity; (5) 
unity and divorce; (6) normalization and subversion; (7) reproduction and 
transformation; (8) construction and deconstruction; (9) relationality and fragility; 
(10) philosophy and sociology; (11) the sociology of concepts and the 
conceptuality of sociology; and (12) the tripartite challenge of critical theory. 
 
. The fourth part has shed light on the book’s most significant limitations. Whilst 
Cordero’s study has made invaluable contributions to our understanding of the 
relationship between crisis and critique, the quality of his inquiry suffers from 
substantial shortcomings. In this respect, the following flaws are particularly 
noteworthy: 
 
1. its lack of definitional precision, especially in relation to central terms and 
arguments; 
2. its failure to cross-fertilize the conceptual approaches in question in a systematic 
fashion; 
3. its absence of ambition in terms of developing an alternative theoretical framework; 
4. its one-sidedly negative conception of normalization processes; 
5. its deficient understanding of the human experience of crisis as a state of normality; 
6. its idealistic portrayal of people’s sense of completion of the world as the norm, rather  
than  the exception; 
  
 
7. its short-sighted privileging of reflexive over intuitive forms of immersion in the world; 
8. its inability to account for the simultaneous presence of objective, normative, and 
subjective dimensions in both experiences of crisis and practices of critique; 
9. its lack of engagement with the extent to which vital aspects, representations, 
and explorations of social life – far from being reducible to material  and  symbolic 
realms of openness and contingency – are shaped by  considerable  degrees  of  
closure and determinacy; 
10. its flirtation with epiphenomenalism, illustrated in its rudimentary grasp of the 
relative autonomy of symbolic forms; 
11. its tendency towards rationalist cognitivism, expressed in its overestimation of 
the power of consciousness and its underestimation of the power of the 
unconscious; 
12. its contradictory advocacy of both anti-essentialism (according to which the social 
world can be conceived of as a domain of relationally constituted constructs, 
constellations, and assemblages) and essentialism (according to which the social 
world can be conceived of as an interactional conglomerate that is divided into 
an epiphenomenal surface level of appearances and an infrastructural substance 
level of underlying  forces); 
13. its incapacity to scrutinize the reasons for, let alone the consequences of, the 
fact that experiences of crisis, as well as processes of critique, can be not only 
enlightening but also blinding; 
14. its failure to develop (a) a typology of crisis, (b) a typology of critique, and (c) a typology of 
crisis–critique relationships. 
 
Irrespective of one’s assessment of the aforementioned limitations, it would be 
inaccurate to disregard the fact that, in his ambitious study, Cordero has made an 
unparalleled contribution to contemporary social theory. As such, it is likely to shape 
paradigmatic debates on the relationship between crisis and critique for a long time 
to come. 
 
 
  
 
 
Notes 
1. Cordero (2017). Unless otherwise indicated, all page references in this review article 
are to this book. With the aim of focusing on the key themes of Cordero’s study, I shall 
quote mainly from the introductory chapter (1–12). 
2. On this point, see also, for instance: Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Chiapello and 
Fairclough (2002); Fairclough (2002); Gadrey et al. (2001); Susen (2015), 201; and Turner 
(2007). 
3. On this point, see, for instance: Habermas (1976); Habermas (1981a, 1981b, 2001). See 
also, for example: Susen (2007), esp. Chapters 1–4. 
4. On this point, see, for example: Susen (2007), 93–4, 216, and 241; Susen (2015), 36, 42, 48, 
95, and 112–13; and Susen (2016b). 
5. On this point, see Susen (2014 [2012]), 184–5.4.  
6. See also Boltanski (2009), 93: ‘tout ce qui arrive’. 
7. On this point, see also, for instance: Susen (2007), 246; Susen and Turner (2011), xxi–
xxii. 
8. On the concepts of power and domination, see, for instance: Susen (2015), esp. 15, 27, 45, 62, 
71, 76, 116, 117, 118, 126, 133, 155, 156, 163, 166, 182, 196, 184, 188, 196, 198, 199, 200, 
201, 216, 227, 243, and  266. 
9. On this point, see Bloch (1959). See also Gunn (1987). In addition, see Susen (2015), 184–
5. 
10. See, for instance, Bazzano (2014). 
11. See, for instance, Heidegger (1992 [1989/1924]) and Heidegger (2001 [1927]). 
12. See, for instance: Boltanski (1990); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2009); Boltanski 
and Honneth (2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski and Thévenot 
(1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Celikates (2009); Susen (2011a); Susen (2014 
[2012]); Susen (2014 [2015]); Susen and Turner (2014); Thévenot (2014). 
13. On the concept of determinacy, see, for instance, Susen (2015), esp. 40, 42, 43, 71, 77, 82, 
87, 90, 97, 99, 101, 138, 142, 173, 178, 180, 189, 264, 265, and 268. On the concept of 
relative determinacy, see, for instance, Susen (2015), 1, 39, 48, 65, 72, 74, 92, 233, 258, 265, 
and 278. 
14. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2016a), esp. 39–47 and 59–60. 
15. For useful discussions of the Marxist distinction between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure’, see, for 
instance: de Lara (1982); Hall (1977); Labica (1982); Larrain (1991 [1983]); Weber (1995). 
See also Susen (2015), 90, 91, 97, 99, 100, 101, 265, 295n27, 298n31, and 300n110. 
16. On the concept of relative autonomy, see, for instance: Susen (2007), 177, 188, 189, 201, 213, 
244, and 285; Susen (2011b), 177, 178, and 186; Susen (2013b), 204, 207, 213, and 220; 
Susen (2015), 80, 81, 88, 99, 101, 105, 129, and 266. 
17. On this point, see, for instance, Susen (2007), 139–40, 216, and 241. 
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